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Abstract. In this paper, we consider state and control path-dependent sto-
chastic zero-sum differential games, where the dynamics and the running cost
include both state and control paths of the players. Using the notion of nonan-
ticipative strategies, we define lower and upper value functionals, which are
functions of the initial state and control paths of the players. We prove that
the value functionals satisfy the dynamic programming principle. The asso-
ciated lower and upper Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equations from the dy-
namic programming principle are state and control path-dependent nonlinear
second-order partial differential equations. We apply the functional Itoˆ calcu-
lus to prove that the lower and upper value functionals are viscosity solutions
of (lower and upper) state and control path-dependent HJI equations, where
the notion of viscosity solutions is defined on a compact subset of an κ-Ho¨lder
space introduced in [43]. Moreover, we show that the Isaacs condition and the
uniqueness of viscosity solutions imply the existence of the game value. For
the state path-dependent case, we prove the uniqueness of classical solutions
for the (state path-dependent) HJI equations.
1. Introduction. Since the seminal papers by Friedman [22] and Fleming and
Souganidis [21], the study of two-player stochastic zero-sum differential games (SZS-
DGs) and nonzero-sum stochastic differential games (SDGs) has grown rapidly in
various aspects; see [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 19, 25, 30, 34, 42, 46] and the refer-
ences therein. Specifically, Friedman in [22] considered SDGs with classical (or
smooth) solutions of the associated partial differential equation (PDE) from dy-
namic programming to prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium and the game
value. Fleming and Souganidis in [21] studied SZSDGs in the Markovian frame-
work with nonanticipative strategies. They proved that the lower and upper value
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functions are unique viscosity solutions (in the sense of [12]) for lower and up-
per Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equations obtained from dynamic programming,
which are nonlinear second-order partial differential equations (PDEs). They also
showed the existence of the game value under the Isaacs condition. Later, the re-
sults of [21] were extended by Buckdahn and Li in [6], who defined the objective
functional by the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). They used the
backward semi-group associated with the BSDE introduced in [35] to obtain the
generalized results of [21]. The weak formulation of SZSDGs and SDGs with ran-
dom coefficients was considered in [19, 25], where the existence of the open-loop
type saddle-point equilibrium as well as the game value was established.
Recently, state path-dependent SZSDGs have been studied extensively in the lit-
erature to consider a general class of SZSDGs including SZSDGs with delay in the
state variable. This extends the results in [6, 21] to the non-Markovian framework.
Unlike [6, 21], for the path-dependent or non-Markovian case, the associated (lower
and upper) HJI equations obtained from dynamic programming are the so-called
(state) path-dependent PDEs (PPDEs) defined on a space of continuous functions,
which is an infinite dimensional Banach space. Hence, the approach for the Hilbert
space in [13, 31] cannot be applied to show the existence (and uniqueness) of viscos-
ity solutions. In [37, 38], state path-dependent SZSDGs in weak formulation were
studied, where the players are restricted to observe the state feedback information.
The existence of viscosity solutions for state path-dependent HJI equations was
shown in [37, 38] in the sense of [16, 17, 18], which involves a nonlinear expectation
in the corresponding semi-jets. For the uniqueness, [37] imposed the assumption on
the maximum dimension of the state space (n ≤ 2) and the nondegeneracy condi-
tion of the diffusion coefficient (see [37, Section 6] and [38, Remark 3.7]). Note that
[38] did not prove the uniqueness of viscosity solutions. As mentioned in [38, p.
10], the major motivation of SZSDGs in weak formulation is to study the existence
of the saddle-point equilibrium; however, it requires more stringent assumptions on
the coefficients than SZSDGs in strong formulation. Zhang in [47] studied path-
dependent SZSDGs in strong formulation, where the existence of the game value
and the approximated saddle-point equilibrium, both under the Isaacs condition,
were established via the approximating technique of the (lower and upper) state
path-dependent HJI equations.1
In this paper, we consider state and control path-dependent stochastic zero-sum
differential games (SZSDGs), where the dynamics and the running cost are depen-
dent on both the state and control path of the players. Note that the paper can be
viewed as a generalization of [47] to the state and control path-dependent case, and
of [41] to the two-player SZSDG framework. We mention that the viscosity solution
of state path-dependent HJI equations was not studied in [47]. In [41], state and
control path-dependent stochastic control problem and (nonzero-sum) differential
games were considered, where the existence of classical (smooth) solutions of the
corresponding state and control path-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation was assumed to establish the verification theorem. Note also that SZS-
DGs with weak formulation in [37, 38] did not consider the control path-dependent
case.
By using the notion of nonanticipative strategies, the lower and upper value func-
tionals are defined, whereby these are functions of the initial state and control paths
1Note that [47] did not consider the existence and uniqueness of (classical or viscosity) solutions
of state path-dependent HJI equations.
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of the players. Then by using the semigroup operator associated with the BSDE
objective functional, we prove that the (lower and upper) value functionals satisfy
the dynamic programming principle, which is the recursive-type value iteration al-
gorithm. In the proof of the dynamic programming principle, the separability of
the space of ca`dla`g functions is essential, which is guaranteed with the Skorohod
metric. The dynamic programming principle also leads to the continuity property
of the (lower and upper) value functionals in their arguments.
The associated lower and upper state and control path-dependent Hamilton-
Jacobi-Isaacs (PHJI) equations from the dynamic programming principle are state
and control path-dependent nonlinear second-order PDEs (PPDEs), whose struc-
tures are fundamentally different from those of PPDEs or state path-dependent HJI
equations in [16, 17, 18, 36, 37, 38, 43]. In particular, the time derivative term also
depends on the control of the players, which is included in supv∈V infu∈U of the
lower PHJI equation and infu∈U supv∈V of the upper PHJI equation (see (30) and
(31)). We apply the functional Itoˆ calculus introduced in [10, 11, 15] to prove that
the lower and upper value functionals are viscosity solutions of the (lower and up-
per) PHJI equations, where the notion of viscosity solutions is defined on a compact
subset of an κ-Ho¨lder space introduced in [43]. Specifically, the notion of viscos-
ity solutions is defined on a compact set Cκ,µ,µ0 , where κ ∈ (0, 12 ) and µ, µ0 > 0,
which provides the precise estimate between the initial state path and its perturbed
one. This initial state path perturbation is essential to prevent starting the dy-
namic programming at the boundary of Cκ,µ,µ0 (see [43, Remark 6]). Then using
the functional Itoˆ calculus and the dynamic programming principle, we show that
the (lower and upper) value functionals are viscosity solutions of the corresponding
PHJI equations. In our definition of viscosity solutions, the predictable dependence
condition for test functions is essential to handle the control path-dependent nature
of the problem, where the similar condition was also introduced in [10, 41].
We also show that if the state and control path-dependent Isaacs condition and
the uniqueness of viscosity solutions hold, then the game admits a value, i.e., the
lower and upper value functionals coincide. This does not require the approxi-
mating technique of the (lower and upper) PHJI equations to the state dependent
(not path-dependent) HJI equations studied in [47]. The general uniqueness of
viscosity solutions in our paper will be investigated in a future research study. In-
stead, we provide the uniqueness of classical solutions for the (lower and upper)
state path-dependent HJI equations. In particular, under an additional assumption
(see Assumption 3), we prove the comparison principle of classical sub- and super-
solutions of the lower and upper state path-dependent HJI equations, which further
implies the uniqueness of classical solutions (for the state path-dependent case).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide notation and pre-
liminary results of the functional Itoˆ calculus introduced in [10, 11, 15, 41]. The
problem formulation is given in Section 3. In Section 4, we show that the dynamic
programming principle and obtain the regularity of the value functionals. In Sec-
tion 5, we introduce the lower and upper PHJI equations and prove that the value
functionals are viscosity solutions of the corresponding PHJI equations. Several
potential future research problems are also discussed at the end of Section 5.
2. Notation and Preliminaries. The n-dimensional Euclidean space is denoted
by Rn, and the transpose of a vector x ∈ Rn by x⊤. The inner product of x, y ∈ Rn
is denoted by 〈x, y〉 := x⊤y, and the Euclidean norm of x ∈ Rn by |x| := 〈x, x〉
1
2 .
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Let Tr(X) be the trace operator of a square matrix X ∈ Rn×n. Let 1 be the
indicator function. Let Sn be the set of n× n symmetric matrices.
We introduce the calculus of path-dependent functionals in [10, 11, 15]; see also
[16, 41, 43]. We follow the notation in [15, 41]. For a fixed T > 0 and t ∈ [0, T ], let
Λnt := C([0, t],R
n) be the set of Rn-valued continuous functions on [0, t], and Λˆnt :=
D([0, t],Rn) the set of Rn-valued ca`dla`g functions on [0, t]. Let ΛEt := C([0, t], E)
and ΛˆEt := D([0, t], E) for E ⊂ R
n. Let Λn×mt := Λ
n
t × Λ
m
t , Λ
n := ∪t∈[0,T ]Λ
n
t , and
Λn×m := ∪t∈[0,T ]Λ
n
t ×Λ
m
t . For any functions in Λ
n, the capital letter stands for the
path and the lowercase letter will denote the value of the function at a specific time.
Specifically, for A ∈ ΛnT , at stands for the value of A at t ∈ [0, T ], and for t ∈ [0, T ],
we denote At := {ar, r ∈ [0, t]} ∈ Λ
n
t by the path of the corresponding function up
to time t ∈ [0, T ]. A similar notation applies to Λˆn. Note that Λn ⊂ Λˆn.
For A ∈ Λˆn and δ > 0, we introduce the following notation:
At,δt[s] :=
{
as if s ∈ [0, t)
at if s ∈ [t, t+ δt]
, A
(h)
t [s] :=
{
as if s ∈ [0, t)
at + h if s = t.
Note that At,δt is the flat extension, and A
h
t is the vertical extension of the path A.
The metric on Λˆn is defined for At, Bt′ ∈ Λˆ
n with t, t′ ∈ [0, T ] and t ≤ t′,
d∞(At, Bt′) := |t− t
′|+ ‖At,t′−t −Bt′‖∞,
where ‖ · ‖∞ is the norm in Λˆ
n
t defined by ‖Bt‖∞ := supr∈[0,t] |br|.
Note that (Λˆn, d∞) is a complete metric space, and (Λˆ
n
t , ‖ · ‖∞) is a Banach
space. The same results hold for (Λn, d∞) and (Λ
n
t , ‖ · ‖∞). Unfortunately, Λˆ
n
t is
not separable under the metric d˜ induced by ‖ · ‖∞. Therefore, we introduce the
following metric: d′∞(At, Bt′) := |t − t
′| + d◦(At,t′−t, Bt′), where with Γ, the class
of strictly increasing and continuous mappings, the Skorohod metric [3, Section 12,
(12.13)] is defined by d◦(At,t′−t, Bt′) := infι∈Γ{supr∈[0,t′] |ιr−r|∨‖At,t′−t−Bt′ι‖∞}.
Here, ‖At,t′−t − Bt′ι‖∞ = supr∈[0,t′] |ar − bιr |, which allows a deformation on the
time scale to define a distance between A and B. As shown in [3, Section 12], d◦ is
a metric and so is d′∞. Then Λˆ
n
t is separable under d
◦ [3, Theorem 12.2]. We can
easily see that d◦ ≤ d˜, which implies d′∞ ≤ d∞.
Definition 2.1. A functional is any function f : Λˆn → R. The functional f is
said to be continuous at At ∈ Λˆ
n, if for each ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that for
each A′t′ ∈ Λˆ
n, d∞(At, A
′
t′) < δ implies |f(At)− f(A
′
t′)| < ǫ. The continuity under
d∞ implies the continuity under d
′
∞. Let C(Λˆ
n) be the set of real-valued continuous
functionals for every path At ∈ Λˆ
n under d∞. The set C(Λ
n) is defined similarly.
Next, we introduce the concept of time and space derivatives of the functional f .
Definition 2.2. (i) Let f : Λˆn → R be the functional. The time derivative (or
horizontal derivative) of f at At is defined by ∂tf(At) := limδt↓0
f(At,δt)−f(At)
δt .
If the limit exists for all At ∈ Λˆ
n, a functional ∂tf : Λˆ
n → R is called the time
derivative of f .
(ii) The space derivative (or vertical derivative) of f at At is defined by ∂xf(At) :=[
∂1xf(At) · · · ∂
n
x f(At)
]
, where for ei, i = 1, . . . , n, being a coordinate unit
vector of Rn, ∂ixf(At) := limh↓0
f(A
(hei)
t )−f(At)
h . If the limit exists for all
At ∈ Λˆ
n and i = 1, . . . , n, a functional ∂xf : Λˆ
n → Rn is called the space
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derivative of f . Note that the second-order space derivative (Hessian) ∂xxf
can be defined in a similar way, where ∂xxf : Λˆ
n → Sn.
Remark 2.1. If a functional f is differentiable in the sense of Definition 2.2 and
depends only on a function (not its path), i.e., f(At) = f(t, at), then the notion of
derivatives in Definition 2.2 is equivalent to those for the classical ones.
From Definition 2.2, let Ck,l(Λˆn) be the set of functionals such that for f ∈
Ck,l(Λˆn), f is k times time differentiable and l times space differentiable in Λˆn,
where all its derivatives are continuous in the sense of Definition 2.1. The set
Ck,l(Λn) is defined similarly. We mention that these sets are well defined in view of
[43, Definition 2.4 and Remark 2] (see also [16, Theorem 2.4] and [10, 11, 15]).
Definition 2.3. Let At ∈ Λ
n. For any κ ∈ (0, 1], A is an κ-Ho¨lder continuous path
if the following limit exists: [[At]]κ := sup0≤s≤r≤t
|as−ar|
|s−r|κ <∞, where we call [[At]]κ
the κ-Ho¨lder modulus of At. The κ-Ho¨lder space is defined by C
κ(Λn) := {At ∈
Λn : [[At]]κ <∞}. The κ-Ho¨lder space with µ > 0 is defined by C
κ,µ(Λn) := {At ∈
Λn : [[At]]κ ≤ µ}. The κ-Ho¨lder space with µ > 0 and µ0 > 0 is defined by
C
κ,µ,µ0(Λn) := {At ∈ Λ
n : [[At]]κ ≤ µ, ‖At‖∞ ≤ µ0}.
We can easily see that Cκ(Λn) ⊂ Λn. The spaces Cκ,µ(Λn) and Cκ,µ,µ0(Λn) have
the following topological property [43, Proposition 1]:
Lemma 2.1. For κ ∈ (0, 1], Cκ,µ(Λn) and Cκ,µ,µ0(Λn) are compact subsets of
(Λn, d∞).
Definition 2.4. Let f : Λn → R be the functional. For κ ∈ (0, 1], f is Ho¨lder
continuous if the following limit exists: [f ]κ;Λn := supAt,A′t′∈Λ
n,At 6=A′t′
|f(At)−f(A
′
t′
)|
dκ∞(At,A
′
t′
) .
Assume that f ∈ C1,2(Λn). We define |f |κ;Λn := supAt∈Λn |f(At)|+ [f ]κ;Λn and
|f |2,κ;Λn := |f |κ;Λn + |∂tf |α;Λn + |∂xf |κ;Λn + |∂xxf |κ;Λn . (1)
The set of functionals such that (1) is finite is denoted by C1,2κ (Λ
n).
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space satisfying the usual condition [27].
Let B be the standard p-dimensional Brownian motion defined on (Ω,F ,P). Let
F = {Ft, 0 ≤ t ≤ T } be the standard natural filtration generated by the Brown-
ian motion B augmented by all the P-null sets of F . Let L2(Ω,Ft,R
n) be the set
of Rn-valued Ft-measurable random vectors such that g ∈ L
2(Ω,Ft,R
n) satisfies
E[|g|2] < ∞. Let L2
F
([t, T ],Rn) be the set of Rn-valued F-adapted stochastic pro-
cesses such that g ∈ L2
F
([t, T ],Rn) satisfies E[
∫ T
t
|g(s)|2ds] < ∞. Let CF([t, T ],R
n)
be the set of Rn-valued continuous and F-adapted stochastic processes such that
g ∈ CF([t, T ],R
n) satisfies E[sups∈[t,T ] |g(s)|
2] <∞.
Let X ∈ ΛnT be the n-dimensional F-adapted stochastic process, which is defined
on (Ω,F ,P). Note that X can be viewed as a mapping from Ω to ΛnT . By using the
notation, xt is the value of X at time t ∈ [0, T ], and for t ∈ [0, T ], Xt := {xr, r ∈
[0, t]} ∈ Λnt is the corresponding path up to time t ∈ [0, T ]. We can see that for any
functional f ∈ C(Λn), {f(Xt), t ∈ [0, T ]} is an F-adapted stochastic process.
We now state the functional Itoˆ formula in [10, 11, 15]
Lemma 2.2. Suppose that X is continuous semi-martingale, and f ∈ C1,2(Λn).
Then for any t ∈ [0, T ],
f(Xt) = f(X0) +
∫ t
0
∂tf(Xr)dr +
∫ t
0
∂xf(Xr)dxr +
1
2
∫ t
0
∂xxf(Xr)d〈x〉r , P-a.s.
6 JUN MOON
3. Problem Formulation. This section provides the precise problem formulation
of state and control path-dependent SZSDGs. The state and control path-dependent
problem was first introduced in [41] to solve the stochastic control problem and
(nonzero-sum) differential game. On the other hand, we study the (state and control
path-dependent) problem in the SZSDG framework.
Let U be the set of U-valued F -progressively measurable and ca`dla`g processes,
where U ⊂ Rm, which is the set of control processes for Player 1. The set of control
processes for Player 2, V , is defined similarly with V ⊂ Rl. It is assumed that U
and V are compact metric spaces with the standard Euclidean norm. The precise
definitions of U and V are given later.
The state and control path-dependent stochastic differential equation (SDE) is
given by{
dxt,At;U,Vs = f(X
t,At;U,V
s , Us, Vs)ds+ σ(X
t,At;U,V
s , Us, Vs)dBs, s ∈ (t, T ]
Xt,At;U,Vt = At ∈ Λ
n
t ,
(2)
where Xt,At;U,Vs := {x
t,At;U,V
r ∈ R
n, r ∈ [0, s]} ∈ Λns is the whole path of the
controlled state process from time 0 to s, and Us := {ur ∈ U, r ∈ [0, s]; u ∈ U} ∈
ΛˆUs ⊂ Λˆ
m
s and Vs := {vr ∈ V, r ∈ [0, s]; v ∈ V} ∈ Λˆ
V
s ⊂ Λˆ
l
s are paths of the control
processes of Players 1 and 2, respectively. In (2), At ∈ Λ
n
t is the initial condition
that is a continuous path starting from time t = 0. Let Λ := Λn and Λˆ := ΛˆU× ΛˆV.
The state and control path-dependent backward stochastic differential equation
(BSDE) is given by
dyt,At;U,Vs = −l(X
t,At;U,V
s , y
t,At;U,V
s , q
t,At;U,V
s , Us, Vs)ds
+qt,At;U,Vs dBs, s ∈ [t, T )
yt,At;U,VT = m(X
t,At;U,V
T ),
(3)
where the pair (yt,At;U,Vs , q
t,At;U,V
s ) ∈ R × R
1×p is the solution of the BSDE. Note
that the BSDE in (3) is coupled with the (forward) SDE in (2). Below, the BSDE
in (3) is used to define the objective functional of Players 1 and 2.
We introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 1. In (2), the coefficients f : Λ× Λˆ→ Rn and σ : Λ× Λˆ→ Rn×p are
bounded. Furthermore, the running and terminal costs in (3), l : Λ×R×R1×p×Λˆ→
R and m : ΛT → R, respectively, are bounded. There exists a constant L > 0 such
that for si ∈ [0, T ] and (X
i
T , U
i
T , V
i
T , yi, qi) ∈ ΛT × ΛˆT × R × R
1×p, i = 1, 2, the
following conditions hold:
|f(X1s1 , U
1
s1 , V
1
s1)− f(X
2
s2 , U
2
s2 , V
2
s2)|
≤ L(d∞(X
1
s1 , X
2
s2) + d∞(U
1
s1 , U
2
s2) + d∞(V
1
s1 , V
2
s2))
|σ(X1s1 , U
1
s1 , V
1
s1)− σ(X
2
s2 , U
2
s2 , V
2
s2)|
≤ L(d∞(X
1
s1 , X
2
s2) + d∞(U
1
s1 , U
2
s2) + d∞(V
1
s1 , V
2
s2))
|l(X1s1 , y1, q1, U
1
s1 , V
1
s1)− l(X
2
s2 , y2, q2, U
2
s2 , V
2
s2)|
≤ L(d∞(X
1
s1 , X
2
s2) + d∞(U
1
s1 , U
2
s2) + d∞(V
1
s1 , V
2
s2) + |y1 − y2|+ |q1 − q2|)
|m(X1T )−m(X
2
T )| ≤ L‖X
1
T −X
2
T ‖∞.
Based on [6, 29, 43, 45, 47, 48], we have the following result:
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the following hold:
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(i) For t ∈ [0, T ), At ∈ Λt and (U, V ) ∈ Λˆ, the SDE in (2) and the BSDE in (3)
admit unique strong solutions, Xt,At;U,V with E[‖Xt,At;U,VT ‖
2
∞|Ft] < ∞ and
(yt,At;U,V , zt,At;U,V ) ∈ CF([t, T ],R
n)× L2
F
([t, T ],R1×p), respectively.
(ii) For, t ∈ [0, T ), t1, t2 ∈ [t, T ] with t2 ≥ t1, A
i
t ∈ Λt, and (U
i, V i) ∈ Λˆ,
i = 1, 2, there exists a constant C > 0, dependent on the Lipschitz constant L
in Assumption 1, such that
E
[
‖X
t,A1t ;U
1,V 1
T ‖
2
∞
∣∣Ft] ≤ C(1 + ‖A1t‖2∞)
E
[
‖X
t,A1t ;U
1,V 1
t2 −At1,t2−t1‖
2
∞
∣∣Ft] ≤ C(1 + ‖A1t1‖2∞)(t2 − t1)
E
[
‖X
t,A1t ;U
1,V 1
T −X
t,A2t ;U
2,V 2
T ‖
2
∞
∣∣Ft]
≤ C‖A1t −A
2
t ‖∞ + CE
[∫ T
t
[
‖U1r − U
2
r ‖
2
∞ + ‖V
1
r − V
2
r ‖
2
∞
]
dr
∣∣Ft].
(iii) For, t ∈ [0, T ), t1, t2 ∈ [t, T ] with t2 ≥ t1, A
i
t ∈ Λt, and (U
i, V i) ∈ Λˆ,
i = 1, 2, there exists a constant C > 0, dependent on the Lipschitz constant L
in Assumption 1, such that
E
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|y
t,A1t ,U
1,V 1
s |
2 +
∫ T
t
|q
t,A1t ,U
1,V 1
r |
2dr
∣∣Ft] ≤ C(1 + ‖A1t‖2∞)
E
[
sup
s∈[t1,t2]
|y
t1,A
1
t1
,U1,V 1
s − y
t1,A
1
t1
,U1,V 1
t1 |
2
∣∣Ft] ≤ C(1 + ‖A1t‖2∞)(t2 − t1)
E
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|y
t,A1t ,U
1,V 1
s − y
t,A2t ,U
2,V 2
s |
2
∣∣Ft]
≤ C‖A1t −A
2
t‖
2
∞ + CE
[∫ T
t
[
‖U1r − U
2
r ‖
2
∞ + ‖V
1
r − V
2
r ‖
2
∞
]
dr
∣∣Ft].
(iv) Suppose that l(1) and l(2) are coefficients of the BSDE in (3) satisfying As-
sumption 1, and η(1), η(2) ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,R) are the corresponding terminal con-
ditions. Let (y(1), q(1)) and (y(2), q(2)) be solutions of the BSDE in (3) with
(l(1), η(1)) and (l(2), η(2)), respectively (note that y
(1)
T = η
(1) and y
(2)
T = η
(2)).
If η(1) ≥ η(2) and l(1) ≥ l(2), then y
(1)
s ≥ y
(2)
s , a.s., for s ∈ [t, T ].
The objective functional of Players 1 and 2 is given by
J(t, At;U, V ) = y
t,At;U,V
t , t ∈ [0, T ], (4)
where y is the first component of the BSDE in (3). Note that J(T,At;U, V ) =
yt,At;U,VT = m(X
t,At;U,V
T ).
Remark 3.1. When l in (3) is independent of y and q, (4) becomes
Jt(t, At;U, V ) = E
[∫ T
t
l(Xt,At;U,Vs , Us, Vs)ds+m(X
t,At;U,V
T )
∣∣Ft].
The admissible control of Players 1 and 2 is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. For t ∈ [0, T ], the admissible control for Player 1 (respectively,
Player 2) is defined such that u := {ur ∈ U, r ∈ [t, T ]} (respectively, v :=
{vr ∈ V, r ∈ [t, T ]}) is an U-valued (respectively, V-valued) F-progressively mea-
surable and ca`dla`g process in L2
F
([t, T ],U) (respectively, L2
F
([t, T ],V)). The set of
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admissible controls of Player 1 (respectively, Player 2) is denoted by U [t, T ] (re-
spectively, V [t, T ]). We identify two admissible control processes of Player 1 (re-
spectively, Player 2) u and u¯ in U [t, T ] (respectively, v and v¯ in V [t, T ]) and write
u ≡ u¯ (respectively, v ≡ v¯) on [t, T ], if P(u = u¯ a.e in [t, T ]) = 1 (respectively,
P(v = v¯ a.e in [t, T ]) = 1).
Given the definition of the admissible controls for Players 1 and 2, we introduce
the concept of nonanticipative strategies for Players 1 and 2.
Definition 3.2. For t ∈ [0, T ], a nonanticipative strategy for Player 1 (respectively,
Player 2) is a mapping α : V [t, T ]→ U [t, T ] (respectively, β : V [t, T ]→ U [t, T ]) such
that for any F-stopping time τ : Ω → [t, T ] and any u1, u2 ∈ U with u1 ≡ u2 on
[t, τ ] (respectively, v1, v2 ∈ V with v1 ≡ v2 on [t, τ ]), it holds that α(u1) ≡ α(u2)
on [t, τ ] (respectively, β(u1) ≡ β(u2) on [t, τ ]). The set of admissible strategies for
Player 1 (respectively, Player 2) is denoted by A[t, T ] (respectively, B[t, T ]).
The following notation captures control path-dependent SZSDGs: for t ∈ [0, T ),
(Zt ⊗ u)[s] :=
{
zs, if s ∈ [0, t)
us, if s ∈ [t, T ],
(Wt ⊗ v)[s] :=
{
ws, if s ∈ [0, t)
vs, if s ∈ [t, T ],
(5)
where Zt := {zr, r ∈ [0, t]} ∈ Λˆ
U
t , u ∈ U [t, T ], Wt := {wr, r ∈ [0, t]} ∈ Λˆ
V
t , and
v ∈ V [t, T ]. Note that (Zt ⊗ u) ∈ U [0, T ] and (Wt ⊗ v) ∈ V [0, T ].
With the help of the notation in (5), the objective functional of (4) that includes
the path of the control of Players 1 and 2 can be written as follows:
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ u,Wt ⊗ v) = y
t,At;Zt⊗u,Wt⊗v
t . (6)
Then for (t, At) ∈ [0, T ]× Λt and (Zt,Wt) ∈ Λˆt, the lower value functional of (6)
for the state and control path-dependent SZSDG can be defined by
L(At;Zt,Wt) = ess inf
α∈A[t,T ]
ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ α(Wt ⊗ v),Wt ⊗ v) (7)
= ess inf
α∈A[t,T ]
ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ α(v),Wt ⊗ v),
where the last equality follows from (5). Moreover, for (t, At) ∈ [0, T ] × Λt and
(Zt,Wt) ∈ Λˆt, the upper value functional of (6) is defined by
U(At;Zt,Wt) = ess sup
β∈B[t,T ]
ess inf
u∈U [t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ u,Wt ⊗ β(Zt ⊗ u)) (8)
= ess sup
β∈B[t,T ]
ess inf
u∈U [t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ u,Wt ⊗ β(u)).
Note that L(AT ;ZT ,WT ) = U(AT ;ZT ,WT ) = m(AT ).
We state some remarks on various formulations of (path-dependent) SZSDGs.
Remark 3.2. (1) One might formulate SZSDGs with control against control, in
which the players can select admissible controls individually. Although this for-
mulation is quite similar to stochastic optimal control and therefore can define
the saddle-point equilibrium, the dynamic programming principle cannot be es-
tablished and the value of the game may fail to exist; see [37, Appendix E] and
[38, Example 2.1]. Note that under this formulation, the necessary condition
for the existence of the saddle-point equilibrium in terms of the (stochastic)
maximum principle was studied in [34].
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(2) The notion of nonanticipative strategies in Definition 3.2 is used in various
zero-sum differential games; see [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 21, 30, 46, 47]. This is the
strong formulation with strategy against control. Under this formulation, it is
possible to establish the dynamic programming principle, to show the existence
of viscosity solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equations, and to iden-
tify the existence of the game value under the Isaacs condition. We also note
that instead of the strong formulation with strategy against control, one can
use the notion of nonanticipative strategy with delay, which is still asymmet-
ric information between the players that allows to show the existence of the
(approximated) saddle-point equilibrium and the game value [5, 7, 47].
(3) Instead of the strong formulation with strategy against control, SZSDGs can
be considered in weak formulation [19, 25, 28, 37, 38]. Note that in [37, 38],
the players are restricted to observe the state feedback information. Since the
information is symmetric, it is convenient to define the saddle-point equilibrium
and show the existence of the game value. The dynamic programming principle
can also be obtained. Note that the notion of viscosity solutions of the HJI
equation requires the nonlinear expectation and some additional assumptions
are required to show the existence and uniqueness of viscosity solutions in the
sense of [16, 17, 18]; see [38, Remark 3.7 and p. 10] and [37, Section 6].
The next remark is on the (lower and upper) value functionals.
Remark 3.3. We can see that the value functionals in (7) and (8) depend on initial
path of both state and control of the players. Consider the situation when the path-
dependence is only in the state variable, i.e., f : Λ×U×V→ Rn, σ : Λ×U×V→
Rn×p, and l : Λ×R×R1×p×U×V→ R. Then, the value functionals can be written
independent of Z and W :
L(At) = ess inf
α∈A[t,T ]
ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;α(v), v)
U(At) = ess sup
β∈B[t,T ]
ess inf
u∈U [t,T ]
J(t, At;u, β(u)).
This is a special case of the SZSDG in this paper, which was studied in [47]. In
addition, for the state and control path-independent case, i.e., the SZSDG in the
Markovian formulation, the value functionals are reduced by
L(t, x) = ess inf
α∈A[t,T ]
ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, x;α(v), v)
U(t, x) = ess sup
β∈B[t,T ]
ess inf
u∈U [t,T ]
J(t, x;u, β(u)),
for any initial state x ∈ Rn and t ∈ [0, T ]; see [6, 21] and the references therein.
Remark 3.4. As mentioned in [41], one main example of the SZSDG considered
in this paper is the delay problem with delay r > 0, where the SDE is given by{
dxt,x¯;U,Vs =
[
f1(x
t,x¯;U,V
s ) + f2(us, us−r, vs, vs−r)
]
ds+ σ(xt,x¯;U,Vs )dBs, s ∈ (t, T ]
xt,x¯;U,Vs = x¯, us = u¯s, vs = v¯s, s ∈ [t− r, t],
and the objective functional is
dyt,x¯;U,Vs = −
[
l1(x
t,x¯;U,V
s , y
t,x¯;U,V
s , q
t,x¯;U,V
s ) + l2(us, us−r, vs, vs−r)
]
ds
+qt,x¯;U,Vs dBs, s ∈ [t, T )
yt,x¯t;U,VT = m(x
t,x¯;U,V
T ).
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Note the initial path of u and v. Stochastic control problems and differential games
with delay can be solved by infinite-dimensional approaches [9, 23, 24].2 However,
their approaches are applicable only to the delay-type problem and cannot be used
to solve the general path-dependent problem. We also note that the path-dependent
problem can be converted into the stochastic control problem (or differential game)
with random coefficients; see [43, Example 4.5] and [39]. More applications of
control problems and differential games with delay and random coefficients can be
found in [8, 20, 39, 33] and the references therein, where their problems can be
handled by the path-dependent analysis studied in this paper.
4. Dynamic Programming Principle. This section establishes the dynamic
programming principle for the lower and upper value functionals.
We first state properties of the value functionals. The proof of the following
result is similar to that in [6, Proposition 3.3] and [29, Proposition 3.3].
Proposition 4.1. Assume that Assumption 1 holds. The lower and upper value
functionals L and U in (7) and (8), respectively, are Ft-measurable random vari-
ables. In fact, they are deterministic functionals on Λ× Λˆ.
In view of Assumption 1 the estimates in Lemma 3.1, and (5), the following result
holds:
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For any t ∈ [0, T ], Ait ∈ Λt and
(Zit ,W
i
t ) ∈ Λˆt, i = 1, 2, there exists a constant C > 0 such that the following
estimates hold: for G := L,U,
∣∣G(A1t ;Z1t ,W 1t )∣∣ ≤ C(1 + ‖A1t‖∞) and∣∣G(A1t ;Z1t ,W 1t )−G(A2t ;Z2t ,W 2t )∣∣
≤ C(‖A1t −A
2
t ‖∞ + ‖Z
1
t − Z
2
t ‖∞ + ‖W
1
t −W
2
t ‖∞).
Remark 4.1. Lemma 4.1 implies that the (lower and upper) value functionals are
continuous with respect to d˜, where d˜ is the metric induced by ‖ · ‖∞. Since d
◦ ≤ d˜
(see Section 2), in view of Definition 2.1, we can easily see that the (lower and
upper) value functionals are continuous with respect to d◦.
Before stating the dynamic programming principle of the lower and upper value
functionals, we introduce the backward semigroup associated with the BSDE in (3).
For any s ∈ [t, t+ τ ] with τ ∈ [t, T − t) and b ∈ L2(Ω,Ft+τ ,R), we define
Πt,t+τ,At;U,Vs [b] := y˘
t,t+τ,At;U,V
s , s ∈ [t, t+ τ ], (9)
where y˘ is the first component of the pair (y˘t,t+τ,At;U,Vs , q˘
t,t+τ,At;U,V
s ) that is the
solution of the following BSDE:
y˘t,t+τ,At;U,Vs = b +
∫ t+τ
s
l(Xt,At;U,Vr , y˘
t,t+τ,At;U,V
r , q˘
t,t+τ,At;U,V
r , Ur, Vr)dr
−
∫ t+τ
s
q˘t,t+τ,At;U,Vr dBr, s ∈ [t, t+ τ ].
Note that (9) can be regarded as a truncated BSDE in terms of the terminal time
t + τ and the terminal condition. The superscripts t and t + τ indicate the initial
2Note that [23, 24] considered the one-player stochastic control problem with delay. Of course,
it is interesting to study the approach of [23, 24] in the SZSDG framework.
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and terminal times, respectively. By definition, we have
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ u,Wt ⊗ v) (10)
= Πt,t+τ,At;Zt⊗u,Wt⊗vt
[
yt,At;Zt⊗u,Wt⊗vt+τ
]
= Πt,t+τ,At;Zt⊗u,Wt⊗vt
[
J(t+ τ,Xt,At;Zt⊗u,Wt⊗vt+τ ; (Zt ⊗ u)t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
.
Now, we state the dynamic programming principle of the lower and upper value
functionals in (7) and (8).
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then for any t, t + τ ∈ [0, T ]
with t < t + τ , and for any At ∈ Λt and (Zt,Wt) ∈ Λˆt, the lower and upper value
functionals in (7) and (8), respectively, satisfy the following dynamic programming
principles:
L(At;Zt,Wt) = ess inf
α∈A[t,t+τ ]
ess sup
v∈V[t,t+τ ]
Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t (11)[
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
U(At;Zt,Wt) = ess sup
β∈B[t,t+τ ]
ess inf
u∈U [t,t+τ ]
Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗u,Wt⊗β(u)
t (12)[
U(X
t,At;Zt⊗u,Wt⊗β(u)
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ u)t+τ , (Wt ⊗ β(u))t+τ )
]
.
Proof. We prove (11) only, as the proof for (12) is similar to that for (11).
Let us define
L
′(At;Zt,Wt) := ess inf
α∈A[t,t+τ ]
ess sup
v∈V[t,t+τ ]
Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t[
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
.
Below, we show L(At;Zt,Wt) ≥ L
′(At;Zt,Wt) and L(At;Zt,Wt) ≤ L
′(At;Zt,Wt).
We modify the proof of [47] to the state and control path-dependent case.
Part (i): L(At;Zt,Wt) ≤ L
′(At;Zt,Wt)
We first show that given At ∈ Λt and (Zt,Wt) ∈ Λˆt, for any ǫ > 0, there exists
αǫ ∈ A[t, T ] such that
L(At;Zt,Wt) ≥ ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ α
ǫ(v),Wt ⊗ v)− ǫ. (13)
In view of [26, Theorem A.3], there exists {αk} with αk ∈ A[t, T ], such that
lim
k→∞
ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ αk(v),Wt ⊗ v)ց L(At;Zt,Wt). (14)
Let Υ¯k := {L(At;Zt,Wt) ≥ J(t, At;Zt ⊗ αk(v),Wt ⊗ v) − ǫ}, k ≥ 1. To make the
disjoint partition of Ω with {Υ¯k}, let Υ1 := Υ¯1 and Υk := Υ¯k \ {∪
k−1
i=1 Υ¯i} for i ≥ 2.
Let αǫ :=
∑∞
k=1 1Akαk ∈ A[t, T ]. Then, in view of the uniqueness of the solution
to the BSDE and (14), we have
L(At;Zt,Wt) =
∞∑
k=1
1Υk ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ αk(v),Wt ⊗ v) (15)
≥
∞∑
k=1
1Υk(J(t, At;Zt ⊗ α
ǫ(v),Wt ⊗ v)− ǫ)
= J(t, At;Zt ⊗ α
ǫ(v),Wt ⊗ v)− ǫ,
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which shows (13). In fact, to show the first equality in (15), for any k ≥ 1, let
α¯ := 1Υkαk + 1ΥCk α
C
k , where αk, α
C
k ∈ A[t, T ], in which αk and α
C
k correspond to
Υk and Υ
C
k , respectively. Based on this construction, we have
ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ α¯(v),Wt ⊗ v)
≤ 1Υk ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ αk(v),Wt ⊗ v) (16)
+ 1ΥC
k
ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ α
C
k (v),Wt ⊗ v).
On the other hand, from [26, Theorem A.3], there exist {vl} and {v
C
l } with vl, v
C
l ∈
V [t, T ] such that
lim sup
l→∞
J(t, At;Z
1
t ⊗ αk(vl), Z
2
t ⊗ v) = ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Z
1
t ⊗ αk(v), Z
2
t ⊗ v)
lim sup
l→∞
J(t, At;Z
1
t ⊗ αk(v
C
l ), Z
2
t ⊗ v) = ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Z
1
t ⊗ α
C
k (v), Z
2
t ⊗ v).
Hence, we have
ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ α¯(v),Wt ⊗ v)
≥ lim sup
l→∞
{1ΥkJ(t, At;Zt ⊗ αk(vl),Wt ⊗ v)
+ 1ΥC
k
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ αk(v
C
l ),Wt ⊗ v)}
= 1Υk ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ αk(v),Wt ⊗ v) (17)
+ 1ΥC
k
ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ α
C
k (v),Wt ⊗ v).
Then, (16) and (17) imply (15); hence, (13) holds.
Now, given At ∈ Λt, let Ψ̂
At
t,t+τ :=
{
A¯t+τ ∈ Λt+τ : a¯r = ar, ∀r ∈ [0, t]
}
. We
note that Ψ̂ is the set of continuous functions, which together with the metric d˜
induced by the norm ‖·‖∞ implies that Ψ̂ is a complete separable metric space. Let
d◦ be the Skorohod metric for Λˆt (see the notation in Section 2). Then in view of [3,
Theorem 12.2], Λˆt is a complete separable metric space, and from [40], Ψ
At;Zt,Wt
t,t+τ :=
Ψ̂Att,t+τ × Λˆt is a complete separable metric space with the metric dˆ := d˜ + d
◦.
Therefore, there exists a countable dense subset, denoted by {Ψ¯k} [44], and for
any (A¯t+τ , Zt,Wt) ∈ Ψ
At;Zt,Wt
t,t+τ and ǫ > 0, there exists (A¯
k
t+τ , Z¯
k
t , W¯
k
t ) ∈ Ψ¯k, k ≥ 1,
such that we have dˆ((A¯t+τ , Zt,Wt), (A¯
k
t+τ , Z¯
k
t , W¯
k
t )) < ǫ. For (A¯
k
t+τ , Z¯
k
t , W¯
k
t ) ∈ Ψ¯k,
we define the set of neighborhood of Ψ¯k by
Ψ′k :=
{
(A¯t+τ , Zt,Wt) ∈ Ψ
At;Zt,Wt
t,t+τ : dˆ((A¯t+τ , Zt,Wt), (A¯
k
t+τ , Z¯
k
t , W¯
k
t )) < ǫ
}
.
In view of this construction, ∪∞k=1Ψ
′
k = Ψ
At;Zt,Wt
t,t+τ , and by a slight abuse of notation,
with Ψ′1 := Ψ
′
1 and Ψ
′
k := Ψ
′
k \{∪
k−1
j=1Ψ
′
k}, k ≥ 2, we still have ∪
∞
k=1Ψ
′
k = Ψ
At;Zt,Wt
t,t+τ ,
where {Ψ′k} is the disjoint partition of Ψ
At;Zt,Wt
t,t+τ .
For any (At, Zt,Wt) ∈ Λt× Λˆt, α
′ ∈ A[t, t+τ ] and v′ ∈ V [t, t+τ ], with the above
construction, together with Lemma 4.1 and Remark 4.1, for each ǫ > 0, there exists
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a constant C > 0 such that
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′(v′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′)t+τ ) (18)
=
∞∑
k=1
1
(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ,Zt,Wt)∈Ψ
′
k
× L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′(v′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′)t+τ )
≥
∞∑
k=1
1
(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ,Zt,Wt)∈Ψ
′
k
× L(A¯kt+τ ; (Z¯
k
t ⊗ α
′(v′))t+τ , (W¯
k
t ⊗ v
′)t+τ )− Cǫ.
Note that (13) implies that there exists α′′k ∈ A[t+ τ, T ] such that for k ≥ 1,
L(A¯kt+τ ; (Z¯
k
t ⊗ α
′(v′))t+τ , (W¯
k
t ⊗ v
′)t+τ )
≥ sup
v∈V[t+τ,T ]
J(t+ τ, A¯kt+τ ; (Z¯
k
t ⊗ α
′′
k(v))t+τ , (W¯
k
t ⊗ v)t+τ )− ǫ.
Hence, from (18), for any v′′ ∈ V [t+ τ, T ], we have
L(A¯kt+τ ; (Z¯
k
t ⊗ α
′(v′))t+τ , (W¯
k
t ⊗ v
′)t+τ ) (19)
≥
∞∑
k=1
1
(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ,Zt,Wt)∈Ψ
′
k
× J(t+ τ, A¯kt+τ ; (Z¯
k
t ⊗ α
′′
k(v
′′))t+τ , (W¯
k
t ⊗ v
′′)t+τ )− Cǫ
= J(t+ τ,X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′′(v′′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′′)t+τ )− Cǫ,
where α′′(v′′) :=
∑∞
k=1 1(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ,Zt,Wt)∈Ψ
′
k
α′′k(v
′′) and v′′ ∈ V [t+ τ, T ].
Let us define
v′′′s := 1s∈[t,t+τ ]v
′
s + 1s∈(t+τ,T ]v
′′
s
α′′′s := 1s∈[t,t+τ ]α
′
s(v
′) + 1s∈(t+τ,T ]α
′′
s (v
′′).
Note that v′′′ ∈ V [t, T ] and α′′′ ∈ A[t, T ]. In view of (5), we have
(Wt ⊗ v
′′′)[s] = 1s∈[t,t+τ ](Wt ⊗ v
′)[s] + 1s∈(t+τ,T ](Wt ⊗ v
′′)[s]
(Zt ⊗ α
′′′(v′′′))[s] = 1s∈[t,t+τ ](Zt ⊗ α
′(v′))[s] + 1s∈(t+τ,T ](Zt ⊗ α
′′(v′′))[s],
where it can be verified thatWt⊗v
′′′ ∈ V [0, T ]. Then from the comparison principle
in (iv) of Lemma 3.1, (9) and (10), we have
Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t[
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′(v′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′)t+τ )
]
≥ Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t[
J(t+ τ,X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′′(v′′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′′)t+τ )
]
− Cǫ
= J(t, At; (Zt ⊗ α
′′′(v′′′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′′′)t+τ )− Cǫ.
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The arbitrariness of v′′′ and α′′′, together with the definition of Π and (10), yields
ess inf
α∈[t,t+τ ]
ess sup
v∈V[t,t+τ ]
Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t[
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
≥ ess inf
α∈[t,T ]
ess sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At; (Zt ⊗ α(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )− Cǫ.
By letting ǫ ↓ 0, we have the desired result.
Part (ii): L(At;Zt,Wt) ≥ L
′(At;Zt,Wt)
We first note that for any fixed α′ ∈ A[t, T ] with v ∈ V [t, T ], its restriction to
[t, t+ τ ] is still nonanticipative independent of any special choice of v ∈ V [t+ τ, T ],
i.e., α′|[t,t+τ ] ∈ A[t, t+ τ ] for v ∈ V [t, t+ τ ], due to the nonanticipative property of
α′. Recall the definition of L′; then with the restriction of α′ to [t, t+ τ ], we have
L
′(At;Zt,Wt) ≤ ess sup
v∈V[t,t+τ ]
Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
′(v),Wt⊗v
t[
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
.
Furthermore, similar to (14), there exists {vk}, with vk ∈ V [t, t+ τ ], such that
lim
k→∞
Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
′(vk),Wt⊗vk
t (20)[
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(vk),Wt⊗vk
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′(vk))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ vk)t+τ )
]
= ess sup
v∈V[t,t+τ ]
Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
′(v),Wt⊗v
t[
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
.
Then by using (20) and the approach of (13), for each ǫ ≥ 0, there exists v′ ∈
V [t, t+ τ ] such that
L
′(At;Zt,Wt) ≤ Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t (21)[
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′(v′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′)t+τ )
]
+ ǫ.
Similar to the argument and the notation introduced in (18) and (19), there exists
v′′k ∈ V [t+ τ, T ], k ≥ 1, such that
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′(v′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′)t+τ )
=
∞∑
k=1
1
(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ,Zt,Wt)∈Ψ
′
k
× L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′(v′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′)t+τ )
≤
∞∑
k=1
1
(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ,Zt,Wt)∈Ψ
′
k
× J(t+ τ, A¯kt+τ ; (Z¯
k
t ⊗ α
′(v′′k ))t+τ , (W¯
k
t ⊗ v
′′
k )t+τ ) + Cǫ
= J(t+ τ,X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′|[t+τ,T ](v
′′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′′)t+τ ) + Cǫ,
where v′′ :=
∑∞
k=1 1(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ,Zt,Wt)∈Ψ
′
k
v′′k .
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Let us define
v′′′s := 1s∈[t,t+τ ]v
′
s + 1s∈(t+τ,T ]v
′′
s
α′s(v
′′′) := 1s∈[t,t+τ ]α
′
s(v
′) + 1s∈(t+τ,T ]α
′
s(v
′′).
Note that v′′′ ∈ V [t, T ] and α′ ∈ A[t, T ]. Then, from (5),
(Wt ⊗ v
′′′)[s] = 1s∈[t,t+τ ](Wt ⊗ v
′)[s] + 1s∈(t+τ,T ](Wt ⊗ v
′′)[s]
(Zt ⊗ α
′(v′′′))[s] = 1s∈[t,t+τ ](Zt ⊗ α
′(v′))[s] + 1s∈(t+τ,T ](Zt ⊗ α
′(v′′))[s],
where Wt ⊗ v
′′′ ∈ V [0, T ]. From (iv) of Lemma 3.1, (9), and (10), we have
L
′(At;Zt,Wt)
≤ Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t[
J(t+ τ,X
t,At;Zt⊗α
′(v′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
′(v′′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′′)t+τ )
]
+ Cǫ
= J(t, At;Zt ⊗ α
′(v′′′),Wt ⊗ v
′′′) + Cǫ.
The arbitrariness of v′′′ and the definition of Π imply,
L
′(At;Zt,Wt) ≤ sup
v∈V[t,T ]
J(t, At;Zt ⊗ α
′(v),Wt ⊗ v) + Cǫ,
and by taking ess inf with respect to α ∈ A[t, T ] and then ǫ ↓ 0, we have the desired
result. Hence, Parts (i) and (ii) show the dynamic programming principle of the
lower value functional L in (11). This completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 4.2. By using standard localization and approximation techniques, Theo-
rem 4.1 can be extended to stopping times.
From Lemma 4.1, the (lower and upper) value functionals are continuous with
respect to the initial state and control paths. We next state the continuity of the
(lower and upper) value functionals in t ∈ [0, T ].
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the lower and upper value
functionals are continuous in t. In particular, there exists a constant C > 0 such
that for any (AT , ZT ,WT ) ∈ ΛT × ΛˆT and t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ] with t
′ := max{t1, t2},
(G := L,U)
|G(At1 ;Zt1 ,Wt1)−G(At2 ;Zt2 ,Wt2)| ≤ C(1 + ‖At′‖∞)|t1 − t2|
1/2.
Proof. We prove the case for the lower value functional only, since the proof for the
upper value functional is similar. Without loss of generality, for any t1 = t, t2 =
t+ τ ∈ [0, T ] with t < t+ τ , we need to prove
−C(1 + ‖At+τ‖∞)τ
1/2 ≤ L(At;Zt,Wt)− L(At+τ ;Zt+τ ,Wt+τ ) (22)
≤ C(1 + ‖At+τ‖∞)τ
1/2.
In view of the dynamic programming principle (11) in Theorem 4.1 and (13), for
any ǫ > 0, there exists αǫ ∈ A[t, t+ τ ] such that for any v ∈ V [t, t+ τ ],
L(At;Zt,Wt) ≥ Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
t[
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
ǫ(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
− ǫ.
The definition of Π implies
L(At;Zt,Wt)− L(At+τ ;Zt+τ ,Wt+τ ) ≥ L
(1) + L(2) − L(3) − ǫ, (23)
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where
L(1) := Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
t[
L(X
t,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
ǫ(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
−Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
t
[
L(At+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
ǫ(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
L(2) := Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
t
[
L(At+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
ǫ(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
−Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
t
[
L(At+τ ;Zt+τ ,Wt+τ )
]
L(3) := Π
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
t
[
L(At+τ ;Zt+τ ,Wt+τ )
]
− L(At+τ ;Zt+τ ,Wt+τ ).
Note that L(i) ≥ −|L(i)| for i = 1, 2, 3.
Now, Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1, the definition of Π, and Jensen’s inequality imply that
there exist a constant C > 0 such that
|L(1)| ≤ CE
[∣∣L(Xt,At;Zt⊗αǫ(v),Wt⊗vt+τ ; (Zt ⊗ αǫ(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ ) (24)
− L(At+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α
ǫ(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
∣∣2∣∣Ft]1/2
≤ CE
[∥∥Xt,At;Zt⊗αǫ(v),Wt⊗vt+τ −At+τ∥∥2∞∣∣Ft]1/2 ≤ C(1 + ‖At+τ‖∞)τ1/2.
Moreover, from the definition of Π and Proposition 4.1, L(3) is equivalent to
L(3) = E
[∫ t+τ
t
l(Xt,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
r , y
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
r ,
qt,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
r , (Zt ⊗ α
ǫ(v))r , (Wt ⊗ v)r)dr
∣∣Ft].
Then Ho¨lder inequality, Assumption 1, Lemma 3.1 imply that
|L(3)| ≤ Cτ1/2E
[∫ t+τ
t
[
1 + ‖Xt,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
r ‖
2
∞ + |y
t,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
r |
2
+ |qt,t+τ,At;Zt⊗α
ǫ(v),Wt⊗v
r |
2
]
dr
∣∣Ft]1/2 ≤ C(1 + ‖At+τ‖∞)τ1/2. (25)
Furthermore, in view of the definitions of the lower value functional in (7) and the
objective functional in (6), we have
L(At+τ ;Zt+τ ,Wt+τ )
= ess inf
α∈A[t+τ,T ]
ess sup
v∈V[t+τ,T ]
J(t+ τ, At+τ ;Zt+τ ⊗ α(v),Wt+τ ⊗ v)
L(At+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
= ess inf
α∈A[t+τ,T ]
ess sup
v∈V[t+τ,T ]
J(t+ τ, At+τ ;Zt ⊗ α(v),Wt ⊗ v).
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From (iii) of Lemmas 3.1, Lemma 4.1, (5), and the definition of Π, we have
|L(2)| ≤ CE
[∣∣L(At+τ ; (Zt ⊗ αǫ(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ ) (26)
− L(At+τ ;Zt+τ ,Wt+τ )
∣∣2|Ft]1/2
≤ CE
[∫ T
t+τ
[
‖(Zt+τ ⊗ α
ǫ(v))r − (Zt ⊗ α
ǫ(v))r‖
2
∞ (27)
+ ‖(Wt+τ ⊗ v)r − (Wt ⊗ v)r‖
2
∞
]
dr
∣∣Ft]1/2 = 0.
By substituting (24)-(26) into (23),
L(At;Zt,Wt)− L(At+τ ;Zt+τ ,Wt+τ ) ≥ −C(1 + ‖At+τ‖∞)τ
1/2 − ǫ.
Hence, the arbitrariness of ǫ implies the first inequality part in (22). The second
inequality part in (22) can be shown in a similar way. We complete the proof.
5. State and Control Path-Dependent Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs Equations
and Viscosity Solutions. In this section, we introduce the lower and upper state
and control path-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (PHJI) equations that are path-
dependent nonlinear second-order PDEs (PPDEs). We show that the (lower and
upper) value functionals are viscosity solutions of the corresponding PHJI equations.
The Hamiltonian, H : Λ × Λˆ× R× Rn × Sn → R, is defined by
H(At, Z
u
t ,W
v
t , y, p, P ) (28)
= 〈f(At, Z
u
t ,W
v
t ), p〉+ l(At, y, 〈p, σ(At, Z
u
t ,W
v
t )〉, Z
u
t ,W
v
t )
+
1
2
Tr
(
Pσ(At, Z
u
t ,W
v
t )σ
⊤(At, Z
u
t ,W
v
t )
)
,
where
Zut [s] :=
{
zs, if s ∈ [0, t)
u if s = t,
W vt [s] :=
{
ws, if s ∈ [0, t)
v if s = t.
(29)
With (28), we introduce the lower PHJI equation
H−(At, Zt,Wt, (∂tL
u,v,L, ∂xL, ∂xxL)(At;Zt,Wt))
:= supv∈V infu∈U
{
∂tL(At;Z
u
t ,W
v
t )
+H(At, Z
u
t ,W
v
t , (L, ∂xL, ∂xxL)(At;Zt,Wt))
}
= 0,
t ∈ [0, T ), (At, Zt,Wt) ∈ Λ × Λˆ
L(AT ;ZT ,WT ) = m(AT ), (AT , ZT ,WT ) ∈ ΛT × ΛˆT ,
(30)
and the upper PHJI equation
H+(At, Zt,Wt, (∂tU
u,v,U, ∂xU, ∂xxU)(At;Zt,Wt))
:= infu∈U supv∈V
{
∂tU(At;Z
u
t ,W
v
t )
+H(At, Z
u
t ,W
v
t , (U, ∂xU, ∂xxU)(At;Zt,Wt))
}
= 0,
t ∈ [0, T ), (At, Zt,Wt) ∈ Λ× Λˆ
U(AT ;ZT ,WT ) = m(AT ), (AT , ZT ,WT ) ∈ ΛT × ΛˆT .
(31)
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Remark 5.1. (1) In (30), ∂tL
u,v(At;Zt,Wt) := ∂tL(At;Z
u
t ,W
u
t ). From Section
2, the time derivative of L in (At, Zt,Wt) (if it exists) can be written as follows:
∂tL(At;Z
u
t ,W
u
t ) = lim
δt↓0
L(At,δt;Zt,δt,Wt,δt)− L(At;Zt,Wt)
δt
,
where (Zut ,W
v
t ) is induced due to the definition of ⊗ in (5) (see also [41]).
The space derivative of L with respect to At is given by ∂xL(At;Zt,Wt) =[
∂1xL(At;Zt,Wt) · · · ∂
n
xL(At;Zt,Wt)
]
(if it exists), where
∂ixL(At;Zt,Wt) = lim
h↓0
L(A
(hei)
t ;Zt,Wt)− L(At;Zt,Wt)
h
.
Note that by the definition in (5), we have L(At;Zt,Wt) = L(At;Z
(hei)
t ,Wt) and
L(At;Zt,Wt) = L(At;Zt,W
(hei)
t ), which implies that L satisfies the predictable
dependence condition in the sense of [10]. Hence, the space derivative of L with
respect to the control of the players is zero; see [10, Remark 4] and [41, Remark
2.3]. The same argument applies to (31).
(2) If there is a functional in C1,2(Λ; Λˆ) in the sense of Definition 2.2, which solves
(30), then it is a classical solution of (30). Also, similar to [16, 36], the classical
sub-solution (respectively, super-solution) is defined if the “= 0” in (30) is
replaced by “≥ 0” (respectively, “≤ 0”). When there is a classical solution
of (30), it means that it is both classical sub- and super-solutions. The same
argument can be applied to the upper PHJI equation in (31).
Remark 5.2. For the state path-dependence case (see Remark 3.3), (30) and (31)
are reduced to the state path-dependent HJI equations in (49) and (50). In addi-
tion, in the Markovian formulation (see Remark 3.3), the (lower and upper) PHJI
equations are equivalent to those in [6, (4.1) and (4.2)]
We fix κ ∈ (0, 12 ) in the κ-Ho¨lder modulus. The notion of the viscosity solution is
given belowas follows, which was first introduced in [43] for the state path-dependent
case.
Definition 5.1. (i) A real-valued functional L ∈ C(Λ; Λˆ) is said to be a viscos-
ity sub-solution of the lower PHJI equation in (30) if for (AT , ZT ,WT ) ∈
ΛT × ΛˆT and µ, µ0 > 0, L(AT ;ZT ,WT ) ≤ m(AT ) and for all test func-
tions φ ∈ C1,2κ (Λ; Λˆ) satisfying the predictable dependence in the sense of
[10], i.e., φ(At;Zt,Wt) = φ(At;Zt−,Wt−) and 0 = (L − φ)(A¯t;Zt,Wt) =
supAs∈Cκ,µ,µ0 (L− φ)(As;Zt,Wt), where A¯t ∈ C
κ,µ,µ0 , the following inequality
holds:
lim inf
µ→∞
H
−(A¯t, Zt,Wt, (∂tφ
u,v, φ, ∂xφ, ∂xxφ)(A¯t;Zt,Wt)) ≥ 0.
(ii) A real-valued functional L ∈ C(Λ; Λˆ) is said to be a viscosity super-solution
of the lower PHJI equation in (30) if for (AT , ZT ,WT ) ∈ ΛT × ΛˆT and
µ, µ0 > 0, L(AT ;ZT ,WT ) ≥ m(AT ) and for all test functions φ ∈ C
1,2
κ (Λ; Λˆ)
satisfying the predictable dependence in the sense of [10], i.e., φ(At;Zt,Wt) =
φ(At;Zt−,Wt−) and 0 = (L−φ)(A¯t;Zt,Wt) = infAs∈Cκ,µ,µ0 (L−φ)(As;Zt,Wt),
where A¯t ∈ C
κ,µ,µ0 , the following inequality holds:
lim sup
µ→∞
H
−(A¯t, Zt,Wt, (∂tφ
u,v, φ, ∂xφ, ∂xxφ)(A¯t;Zt,Wt)) ≤ 0.
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(iii) A real-valued functional L ∈ C(Λ; Λˆ) is said to be a viscosity solution if it is
both a viscosity sub-solution and super-solution of (30).
(iv) The viscosity sub-solution, super-solution and solution of the upper PHJI equa-
tion in (31) are defined in similar ways.
Remark 5.3. (1) In Definition 5.1, in view of Remark 5.1, ∂tφ
u,v(A¯t;Zt,Wt) :=
∂tφ(A¯t;Z
u
t ,W
u
t ). For the Markovian case, Definition 5.1 is equivalent to that
of the classical one in [6, 12, 45]. Moreover, we can easily check that if the
viscosity solution of (30) further belongs to C1,2κ (Λ; Λˆ) satisfying the predictable
dependence, then it is also the classical solution of (30). The same argument
applies to (31). This implies that when the (lower and upper) value functionals
are in C1,2κ (Λ; Λˆ), they are classical solutions of the (lower and upper) PHJI
equations.
(2) The definition of viscosity solutions in Definition 5.1 is different from that in
[16, 17, 18], which was applied to SZSDGs in weak formulation in [37, 38].
In particular, in [16, 17, 18], a nonlinear expectation was included in the cor-
responding semi-jets, which is closely related to a certain class of BSDEs via
Feynman-Kac formula. It is interesting to investigate the relationship (or equiv-
alence) between Definition 5.1 and the definition in [16, 17, 18]. As noted in
Section 1 and [38, Remark 3.7 and p. 10], the general uniqueness in the sense
of [16, 17, 18] has not been completely solved, and the SZSDG in weak formu-
lation requires more stringent assumptions on the coefficients than the SZSDG
in strong formulation. Since we consider the SZSDG in strong formulation,
we use the notion of viscosity solutions in [43], which was applied to the state
path-dependent (one-player) stochastic control problem in strong formulation.
A similar definition was also introduced in [39] to study a class of stochastic
HJB equations (in strong formulation).
Remark 5.4. This remark will be used in the proof of Theorem 5.1 given below.
The condition of the predictable dependence for the test function φ in Definition
5.1 is introduced due to the control path-dependent nature of the SZSDG with (5).
Specifically, from the predictable dependence of φ with resect to the control of the
players in the sense of [10], i.e., φ(At;Zt,Wt) = φ(At;Zt−,Wt−), and the definition
in (29) and (5), it holds that φ(At;Zt,Wt) = φ(At;Z
(hei)
t ,Wt) and φ(At;Zt,Wt) =
φ(At;Zt,W
(hei)
t ) (see also (1) of Remark 5.1). Therefore, the (space) derivative of
φ with respect to the control of the players is zero, i.e., ∂uφ = 0, ∂uuφ = 0, ∂vφ = 0
and ∂vvφ = 0. Similar discussions can be found in [10, Remark 4] and [41, Remark
2.3]. We should also mention that for the state path-dependent case (see Remarks
3.3 and 5.2), the predictable dependence condition is not needed.
We state the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then the lower value functional
in (7) is the viscosity solution of the lower PHJI equation in (30). The upper value
functional in (8) is the viscosity solution of the upper PHJI equation in (31).
Before proving the theorem, for µ > 0, ǫ ∈ (0, µ), r ∈ [0, t] and At ∈ C
κ,µ,µ0 , let
Aǫt be the perturbed version of At defined by
aǫr :=
{
ar, if |ar − at| ≤ (µ− ǫ)|r − t|
κ
at + (µ− ǫ)(t− r)
κ ar−at
|ar−at|
, if |ar − at| ≥ (µ− ǫ)|r − t|
κ.
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Note that Aǫt := {a
ǫ
r, r ∈ [0, t]}. The perturbation is essential to prove Theorem
5.1; see [43, Remark 6].
We state the following lemma, whose proof is given in [43, Lemma 5.1].
Lemma 5.1. Let µ, µ0 > 0. Assume that [[At]]κ ≤ µ, ‖At‖∞ ≤ µ0, i.e., At ∈
Cκ,µ,µ0 , and ǫ ∈ (0, 12µ]. Then we have
(i) ‖Aǫt −At‖∞ ≤ 2µ0ǫ(µ− ǫ)
−1 ≤ 4µ0ǫµ
−1.
(ii) [[Aǫt ]]κ ≤ µ.
(iii) There exists a constant C > 0, independent of µ, such that for any d with
d
2 (
1
2 − κ) > 1 and t+ τ < T , P([[X
t,Aǫt;Zt⊗u,Wt⊗v
t+τ ]]κ > µ) ≤ Cτ
d( 12−κ)ǫ−d.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is given as follows.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We first prove that the lower value functional in (7) is the
viscosity super-solution of the lower PHJI equation in (30). Note that in view of
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, it is clear that L ∈ C(Λ; Λˆ). Furthermore, from (7), we have
L(AT ;ZT ,WT ) ≥ m(AT ).
From the definition of the viscosity super-solution in (ii) of Definition 5.1 and
Lemma 2.1, for φ ∈ C1,2κ (Λ; Λˆ), µ > 1 and µ0 > 0,
0 = (L− φ)(A¯t;Zt,Wt) = inf
As∈Cκ,µ,µ0
(L − φ)(As;Zt,Wt),
where A¯t ∈ C
κ,µ,µ0 . Let δ := µ0 − ‖A¯t‖∞ > 0.
For any ǫ ∈ (0, 12∧
δµ
8µ0
), in view of (i) and (ii) in Lemma 5.1, we have ‖A¯ǫt−A¯t‖∞ ≤
4µ0ǫµ
−1 < δ2 . Consider the following F-stopping time:
ξǫ := inf{r > t : [[X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
r ]]κ > µ}
∧ inf{r > t : ‖X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
r ‖∞ > µ0}.
By definition, for any s < ξǫ, X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
s ∈ Cκ,µ,µ0 and for a small τ with
t+ τ ≤ T ,
{ξǫ ≤ t+ τ} ⊂ {[[X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ]]κ > µ} ∪ {‖X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ‖∞ > µ0}.
Hence, from (iii) of Lemma 5.1, we have
P
(
[[X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ]]κ > µ
)
≤ Cτd(
1
2−κ)ǫ−d,
and by (ii) of Lemma 3.1 and Markov inequality,
P
(
‖X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ‖∞ > µ0
)
≤ P
(
‖X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ − A¯
ǫ
t,t+τ‖∞ >
δ
2
)
≤ C(1 + µ60)τ
3/δ6.
This implies that
P(ξǫ ≤ t+ τ) ≤ Cτd(
1
2−κ)ǫ−d + C(1 + µ60)τ
3/δ6 ↓ 0 as τ ↓ 0. (32)
Now, from the dynamic programming principle in (11) of Theorem 4.1,
L(A¯ǫt ;Zt,Wt)− φ(A¯
ǫ
t ;Zt,Wt) (33)
= ess inf
α∈A[t,t+τ ]
ess sup
v∈V[t,t+τ ]
Π
t,t+τ,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t[
L(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
− φ(A¯ǫt ;Zt,Wt).
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Note also that
L(A¯ǫt ;Zt,Wt) ≥ ess sup
v∈V[t,t+τ ]
ess inf
u∈U [t,t+τ ]
Π
t,t+τ,A¯ǫt ;Zt⊗u,Wt⊗v
t[
L(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u,Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ u)t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
.
Then similar to (21), for any ǫ′ > 0, there exists uǫ
′
∈ U [t, t+ τ ] such that for any
v ∈ V [t, t+ τ ],
L(A¯ǫt ;Zt,Wt) ≥ Π
t,t+τ,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t (34)[
L(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
− ǫ′τ,
where in view of the definition of Π, Π in the above expression can be rewritten as
(superscript t+ τ is omitted)
dy
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s = −l(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s , y
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s ,
q
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)s, (Wt ⊗ v)s)ds
+q
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s dBs, s ∈ [t, t+ τ)
y
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t+τ = L(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ ).
(35)
On the other hand, by using the functional Itoˆ formula in Lemma 2.2, we have
φ(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s ; (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)s, (Wt ⊗ v)s) (36)
= φ(A¯ǫt ;Zt,Wt) +
∫ s
t
F (X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)dr
−
∫ s
t
l(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r , φ(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r ; (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r),
〈∂xφ(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r ; (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r , (Wt ⊗ v)r),
σ(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)〉, (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)dr
+
∫ s
t
〈∂xφ(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r ; (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r , (Wt ⊗ v)r),
σ(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)〉dBr,
where
F (At, Z
u
t ,W
v
t ) = ∂tφ(At;Z
u
t ,W
v
t ) +
1
2
Tr
(
∂xxφ(At;Zt,Wt)σσ
⊤(At, Z
u
t ,W
v
t )
)
+ 〈∂xφ(At;Zt,Wt), f(At, Z
u
t ,W
v
t )〉
+ l(At, φ(At;Zt,Wt), 〈∂xφ(At;Zt,Wt), σ(At, Z
u
t ,W
v
t )〉, Z
u
t ,W
v
t ).
Here, we used the fact that the (space) derivative of φ with respect to the control
of the players is zero as stated in Remark 5.4.
Let
y¯
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,W⊗t v
s := φ(X
t,A¯ǫt ;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s ; (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ)s, (Wt ⊗ v)s) (37)
− y
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s
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q¯
t,A¯ǫt ;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s := 〈∂xφ(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r ; (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r), (38)
σ(X
t,A¯ǫt ;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)〉
− q
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s .
From (35) and (36),
dy¯
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s (39)
= F (X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)s, (Wt ⊗ v)s)ds+
[
−Hsy¯
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s
− 〈H¯s, q¯
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s 〉
]
ds+ q¯
t,A¯ǫt ;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
s dBs,
where |H | ≤ C and |H¯| ≤ C due to Assumption 1. We have from (37),
y¯
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t+τ = φ(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
− L(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ ).
Notice that (39) is a linear BSDE; hence, by using Lemma 2.2 and [48, Proposi-
tion 4.1.2], its explicit unique solution can be written as follows:
y¯
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t = E
[
y¯
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t+τ Φt+τ (40)
−
∫ t+τ
t
ΦrF (X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)dr
∣∣Ft],
where Φ is the scalar-valued state transition process given by dΦr = ΦrHrdr +
ΦrH¯rdBr, r ∈ (t, t+τ ], with Φt = 1, i.e., Φr = exp
(∫ r
t H¯sdBs +
∫ r
t [Hs −
1
2 |H¯s|
2]ds
)
.
From (33) and (34), together with (40) and the predictable dependence of φ,
L(A¯ǫt ;Zt,Wt)− φ(A¯
ǫ
t ;Zt,Wt) + ǫ
′τ (41)
≥ E
[
−y¯
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t+τ Φt+τ
+
∫ t+τ
t
ΦrF (X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)dr
∣∣Ft]
= E
[∫ t+τ
t
F (A¯t, (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)dr|Ft
]
+ L(1) + L(2) + L(3),
where
L(1) := −E
[
y¯
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t+τ Φt+τ |Ft
]
L(2) := E
[∫ t+τ
t
F (X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)dr
−
∫ t+τ
t
F (A¯t, (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)dr|Ft
]
L(3) := E
[∫ t+τ
t
ΦrF (X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)dr
−
∫ t+τ
t
F (X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)dr|Ft
]
.
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In view of (ii) in Lemma 3.1 and the fact that Φ is the linear SDE, we have
E
[
‖X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t+τ − A¯
ǫ
t,τ‖
2
∞
∣∣Ft] ≤ Cτ, E[ sup
r∈[t,t+τ ]
|Φr − 1|
2|Ft
]
≤ Cτ.
Furthermore, due to the property of φ ∈ C1,2κ (Λ; Λˆ) and Assumption 1, for t1, t2 ∈
[t, T ] and At1 , At2 ∈ Λ,
|φ(A1t1 ;Z,W )− φ(A
2
t2 ;Z,W )| ≤ Cd
κ
∞(A
1
t1 , A
2
t2)
|F (A1t1 , Z,W )− F (A
2
t2 , Z,W )| ≤ Cd
κ
∞(A
1
t1 , A
2
t2).
Then, from the definition of the viscosity super-solution (ii) in Definition 5.1, Lem-
mas 4.1 and 4.2, and the property of φ, we have
L(A¯ǫt ;Zt,Wt)− φ(A¯
ǫ
t ;Zt,Wt)
= L(A¯t;Zt,Wt)− φ(A¯t;Zt,Wt) + L(A¯
ǫ
t ;Zt,Wt)− L(A¯t;Zt,Wt)
+ φ(A¯t;Zt,Wt)− φ(A¯
ǫ
t ;Zt,Wt)
≤ C‖A¯ǫt − A¯t‖∞ + C‖A¯
ǫ
t − A¯t‖
κ
∞ ≤ C(4µ0ǫµ
−1)κ. (42)
Note that by (37), (42), Ho¨lder inequality, Lemma 3.1 and (32),
|L(1)| ≤ P(ξǫ < t+ τ)
1
2E
[∣∣φ(Xt,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗uǫ′ ,Wt⊗vt+τ ; (Zt ⊗ uǫ′)t+τ
− L(X
t,A¯ǫt ;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
∣∣2Φ2t+τ ∣∣Ft] 12
≤ C(1 + µ60)
(
τ
d
2 (
1
2−κ)ǫ−
d
2 +
τ
3
2
δ3
)
(τ
1
2 + τ
κ
2 + C(4µ0ǫµ
−1)
κ
2 ). (43)
From (ii) of Lemma 3.1, we also have
|L(2)| ≤ E
[∫ t+τ
t
∣∣F (A¯ǫt , (Zt ⊗ uǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)
− F (A¯t, (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)
∣∣dr∣∣Ft]
+ E
[∫ t+τ
t
∣∣F (Xt,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗uǫ′ ,Wt⊗vr , (Zt ⊗ uǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)
− F (A¯ǫt , (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)
∣∣dr∣∣Ft]
≤ CτE
[
dκ∞(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗u
ǫ′ ,Wt⊗v
r , A¯
ǫ
t)|Ft
]
+ Cτdκ∞(A¯
ǫ
t , A¯t)
≤ Cτ1+
κ
2 + Cτ(4µ0ǫµ
−1)κ, (44)
and
|L(3)| ≤ CE
[∫ t+τ
t
(Φr − 1)dr
∣∣Ft] ≤ CτE[ sup
r∈[t,t+τ ]
|Φr − 1||Ft
]
≤ Cτ
3
2 . (45)
Hence, by substituting (42)-(45) into (41), we have
(4µ0ǫµ
−1)κ
1
τ
+ C(1 + µ60)
(
τ
d
2 (
1
2−κ)−1ǫ−
d
2 +
τ
3
2
δ3
)
(τ
1
2 + τ
κ
2 + C(4µ0ǫµ
−1)
κ
2 )
+ Cτ
κ
2 + C(4µ0ǫµ
−1)κ + Cτ
1
2 + ǫ′
≥
1
τ
E
[∫ t+τ
t
F (A¯t, (Zt ⊗ u
ǫ′)r, (Wt ⊗ v)r)dr|Ft
]
.
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Let τ = µ−
κ
2 . Then the arbitrariness of v and ǫ′, and the definition of F imply that
0 ≥ lim sup
µ→∞
H
−(A¯t, Zt,Wt, (∂tφ
u,v, φ, ∂xφ, ∂xxφ)(A¯t;Zt,Wt)).
This shows that (7) is the viscosity super-solution of (30).
Next, we prove that (7) is the viscosity sub-solution of the lower PHJI equation
in (30). From (i) in Definition 5.1 and Lemma 2.1, for φ ∈ C1,2κ (Λ; Λˆ), µ, µ0 > 0,
0 = (L− φ)(A¯t;Zt,Wt) = sup
As∈Cκ,µ,µ0
(L − φ)(As;Zt,Wt),
where A¯t ∈ C
κ,µ,µ0 . This implies that L(A¯t;Zt,Wt) = φ(A¯t;Zt,Wt), and for At 6=
A¯t, φ(At;Zt,Wt) ≥ L(At;Zt,Wt).
From Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, L ∈ C(Λ; Λˆ), and due to the definition of the lower
value functional, L(AT ;ZT ,WT ) ≤ m(AT ). Then it is necessary to prove that
lim inf
µ→∞
H
−(A¯t, Zt,Wt, (∂tφ
u,v, φ, ∂xφ, ∂xxφ)(A¯t;Zt,Wt)) ≥ 0.
Now, suppose that this is not true, i.e., there exists a finite µ′ > 0 such that for
some θ > 0,
H
−(A¯t, Zt,Wt, (∂tφ
u,v, φ, ∂xφ, ∂xxφ)(At;Zt,Wt)) ≤ −θ < 0,
where in view of the definition of F , supv∈V infu∈U F (A¯t, Z
u
t ,W
v
t ) ≤ −θ < 0. Note
that V and U are compact; hence, there exists a measurable function γ : V → U
such that for any v ∈ V with |r − t| ≤ τ0,
F (A¯r, Z
γ(v)
r ,W
v
r ) ≤ −
1
2
θ. (46)
On the other hand, from (11) of Theorem 4.1, we have
ess inf
α∈A[t,t+τ ]
ess sup
v∈V[t,t+τ ]
Π
t,t+τ,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t[
L(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗α(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ α(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
− L(A¯ǫt ;Zt,Wt) = 0.
By defining γs(v) := γ(vs(ω)) for (s, ω) ∈ [t, T ] × Ω, we have γ ∈ A[t, t + τ ] and
Zt ⊗ γ ∈ A[0, T ]. This, together with the definition of Π and the comparison
principle in (iv) of Lemma 3.1, implies that
ess sup
v∈V[t,t+τ ]
Π
t,t+τ,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗γ(v),Wt⊗v
t[
φ(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗γ(v),Wt⊗v
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ γ(v))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v)t+τ )
]
− φ(A¯ǫt ;Zt,Wt) ≥ 0.
For each ǫ′ > 0, similar to (21), we can choose v′ ∈ V [t, t+ τ ] such that
Π
t,t+τ,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗γ(v
′),Wt⊗v
′
t[
φ(X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗γ(v
′),Wt⊗v
′
t+τ ; (Zt ⊗ γ(v
′))t+τ , (Wt ⊗ v
′)t+τ )
]
− φ(A¯ǫt ;Zt,Wt) ≥ −ǫ
′τ.
Note (37) and (38). Then, similar to (40), by Lemma 2.2, we have
1
τ
E
[∫ t+τ
t
ΦrF (X
t,A¯ǫt;Zt⊗γ(v
′),Wt⊗v
′
r , (Zt ⊗ γ(v
′))r , (Wt ⊗ v
′)r)dr
∣∣Ft] ≥ −ǫ′.
With the same technique as in the super-solution case and the definition of γ, by
letting τ ↓ 0, the arbitrariness of ǫ′ and (46) imply that 0 ≤ F (A¯r , Z
γ(v)
r ,W vr ) ≤
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− 12θ. This induces θ ≤ 0, which leads to a contradiction. Hence, (7) is the viscosity
sub-solution of the lower PHJI equation in (30).
The proof for the upper value functional U being a viscosity solution to the upper
PHJI equation in (31) is similar. We complete the proof of the theorem.
We now discuss the existence of the game value of the SZSDG under the Isaacs
condition. Specifically, we introduce the state and control path-dependent Isaacs
condition: for (At, Zt,Wt, r, y, p, P ) ∈ Λ× Λˆ× R× R× R
n × Sn,
H(At, Zt,Wt, r, y, p, P ) (47)
:= H−(At, Zt,Wt, r, y, p, P ) = H
+(At, Zt,Wt, r, y, p, P ).
Then the existence of the game value can be stated as follows:
Theorem 5.2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and the uniqueness of the viscosity
solutions of (30) and (31) hold. Under the Isaacs condition in (47), the game has
a value, i.e., L(At) = U(At) =: G(At), where G is the unique viscosity solution of
the following PHJI equation:{
H(At, Zt,Wt, (∂tG
u,v,G, ∂xG, ∂xxG)(At;Zt,Wt))
G(AT ;ZT ,WT ) = m(AT ), (AT , ZT ,WT ) ∈ ΛT × ΛˆT .
(48)
Proof. In view of Theorem 5.1 and the uniqueness assumption, the lower value
functional L and the upper value functional U are the unique viscosity solutions
of (30) and (31), respectively. Then, the Isaacs condition in (47) implies L(At) =
U(At) =: G(At), which is the unique solution to the PHJI equation in (48). We
complete the proof.
Before concluding the paper, we discuss the state path-dependent case, which is
a special case of the SZSDG in this paper and was studied in [47].3 Specifically, as
stated in Remarks 3.3 and 5.2, we need to assume that
Assumption 2. f : Λ×U×V→ Rn, σ : Λ×U×V→ Rn×p, l : Λ× R× R1×p ×
U×V→ R.
Remark 5.5. With Assumption 2, (47) becomes the state path-dependent Isaacs
condition in [47, (3.2)]. Hence, Theorem 5.2 is reduced to [47, Theorem 3.1] when
Assumption 2 holds.
Under Assumption 2, the lower and upper PHJI equations in (30) and (31) are
reduced to the state path-dependent HJI equations (see Remark 5.2):
∂tL(At) + supv∈V infu∈UH(At, u, v, (L, ∂xL, ∂xxL)(At)) = 0,
t ∈ [0, T ), At ∈ Λ
L(AT ) = m(AT ), AT ∈ ΛT ,
(49)
and 
∂tU(At) + infu∈U supv∈VH(At, u, v, (U, ∂xU, ∂xxU)(At)) = 0,
t ∈ [0, T ), At ∈ Λ
U(AT ) = m(AT ), AT ∈ ΛT .
(50)
3As mentioned in Section 1, [47] considered the existence of the game value and the approxi-
mated saddle-point equilibrium, both under the Isaacs condition, but did not study the existence
and uniqueness of (viscosity or classical) solutions of state path-dependent HJI equations.
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Assumption 3. Let H¯(At, y, p, P ) := supv∈V infu∈UH(At, u, v, y, p, P ) and
H˜(At, y, p, P ) := infu∈U supv∈VH(At, u, v, y, p, P ). For any (At, p) ∈ Λ×R, y1, y2 ∈
R and P1, P2 ∈ S
n with y1 ≥ y2 and P1 ≤ P2,
H¯(At, y1, p, P1) ≤ H¯(At, y2, p, P2), H˜(At, y1, p, P1) ≤ H˜(At, y2, p, P2).
We state the uniqueness of classical solutions of (49) and (50).
Proposition 5.1. Assume that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Suppose that L1
and L2 are classical sub- and super-solutions of the lower PHJI equation in (49),
respectively. Then we have L1(At) ≤ L2(At) for At ∈ Λ. The same result holds for
the upper PHJI equation in (50). Consequently, there is a unique classical solution
of (49) and (50).
Proof. Let L¯1(At) := L1(At) −
δ
t , where δ > 0. Then we can easily see that L¯ is a
classical sub-solution of the following PDE (see (2) of Remark 5.1):{
∂tL¯1(At) + H¯(At, (L¯1, ∂xL¯1, ∂xxL¯1)(At)) ≥
δ
t2 , t ∈ [0, T ), At ∈ Λ
L¯1(AT ) = m(AT )−
δ
T , AT ∈ ΛT .
Since L1 ≤ L2 follows from L¯1 ≤ L2 in the limit δ ↓ 0, it suffices to prove the
theorem with the following additional assumption:
∂tL1(At) + H¯(At, (L1, ∂xL1, ∂xxL1)(At)) ≥ ν > 0,
where ν := δt2 and limt→0 L1(At) = −∞ uniformly on [0, T ).
Assume that this is not true, that is, there exists A′t′ ∈ Λ with t
′ ∈ [0, T ] such
that k′ := L1(A
′
t′ )− L2(A
′
t′) > 0. In view of Lemma 2.1, there exists A¯t¯ ∈ C
κ,µ,µ0
with t¯ ∈ [0, T ] such that L1(A¯t¯) − L2(A¯t¯) = supAt∈Cκ,µ,µ0 L1(At) − L2(At) ≥ k
′.
Then from [36, Lemma 9], we have ∂t(L1 − L2)(A¯t¯) ≤ 0, ∂x(L1 − L2)(A¯t¯) = 0 and
∂xx(L1 − L2)(A¯t¯) ≤ 0. This, together with Assumption 3 and the fact that L2 is
the classical super-solution, implies that
0 ≥ ∂tL2(A¯t¯) + H¯(A¯t¯, (L2, ∂xL2, ∂xxL2)(A¯t¯))
≥ ∂tL1(A¯t¯) + H¯(A¯t¯, (L1, ∂xL1, ∂xxL1)(A¯t¯)) ≥ ν > 0,
which induces a contradiction. Hence, L1(At) ≤ L2(At) for At ∈ Λ. Suppose that
Lˆ and L˜ are classical solutions of (49). Then we have Lˆ ≤ L˜ and Lˆ ≥ L˜, which
implies L := Lˆ = L˜. Hence, the uniqueness follows. This completes the proof.
There are several interesting potential future research problems.
One important problem is the uniqueness of viscosity solutions of the (lower and
upper) PHJI equations in (30) and (31). As mentioned in Section 1, the uniqueness
has not been shown even in the case of (strong and weak formulation) state path-
dependent SZSDGs [38, 37, 47].
Another problem is the existence of the (approximated) saddle-point equilibrium
using the notion of nonanticipative strategies with delay as mentioned in (2) of Re-
mark 3.2. For the state dependent case (with Assumption 2), this was shown in [47,
Theorem 4.13] under the Isaacs condition, where the key step is approximating the
PHJI equation in (49) and (50) to the state-dependent (not state path-dependent)
HJI equations. Note that there is a unique viscosity solution of the approximated
(lower and upper) state-dependent HJI equations in view of [6, Theorem 5.3]. Then,
the existence of the (approximated) saddle-point equilibrium can be shown using
the property of nonanticipative strategies with delay [5, Lemma 2.4]. We speculate
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that the approach of [47, Theorem 4.13] can be applied to the state and control
path-dependent SZSDG of this paper.
We can consider the problem in weak formulation. As noted in (3) of Remark
3.2, one major feature of this formulation is the symmetric feedback information
between the players, which is convenient to show the existence of the saddle-point
equilibrium and the game value.
Finally, the forward-backward stochastic differential equation given in (2) and
(3) is not fully coupled in the sense that the BSDE in (3) is not included in the
(forward) SDE in (2). This can be extended to the fully-coupled FBSDE, where (2)
is also dependent on (3). This can be viewed as a generalization of [29], where the
major challenge is the case when the diffusion term of (2) depends on the second
component of the solution of the BSDE, since the associated PHJI equation should
require an additional algebraic equation.
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